16-3-105 - Release by arresting authority.

(1) When a person has been arrested without a warrant, he may be released by the arresting authority on its own authority if:

(a) The arresting officer or a responsible command officer of the arresting authority is satisfied that there are no adequate grounds for criminal complaint against the person arrested; or

(b) The offense for which the person was arrested and is being held is a misdemeanor or petty offense and the arresting officer or a responsible command officer of the arresting authority is satisfied that the person arrested will obey a summons commanding his appearance at a later date.

(1.5) No person arrested for any crime or offense, the underlying factual basis of which includes an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S., shall be released at the scene of the alleged crime pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

(2) If the person is released in accordance with subsection (1) (b) of this section, he shall be given a summons and complaint as provided for in sections 16-2-104 and 16-2-106 and shall sign a written acknowledgment of its receipt and a promise to appear at the time and place specified.

Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 199, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-3-105. L. 94: (1.5) added, p. 2034, § 12, effective July 1.

The statutes and procedural rules do not require that person charged with a misdemeanor be given a copy of the complaint prior to being released on bail. Weld County Court v. Richards, 812 P.2d 650 (Colo. 1991).

Applied in People v. Rothe, 43 Colo. App. 274, 606 P.2d 79 (1979).

16-3-106 - Peace officer may pursue offender.

When any peace officer is in fresh pursuit of any alleged offender, having a warrant for his arrest or having knowledge that such warrant has been issued, or, in the absence of an arrest warrant, when the offense was committed in the officer's presence or the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged offender has committed a criminal offense, and the alleged offender crosses a boundary line marking the territorial limit of his authority, such peace officer may pursue him beyond such boundary line and make the arrest, issue a summons and complaint, or issue a notice of penalty assessment.

Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 199, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-3-106.

Am. Jur.2d. See 5 Am. Jur.2d, Arrest, § § 69, 72.

C.J.S. See 6A C.J.S., Arrest, § 18.

Purpose of section. The general assembly, in enacting this section, intended to limit peace officers to exercising their arrest powers and making their law enforcement efforts within the territorial limits of their authority and to require that local peace officers be advised of, and participate in, the extraterritorial law enforcement activities of other peace officers. People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981); People v. Florez, 680 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).

This section, by negative inference, limits peace officers' authority to arrest to the territorial boundaries of their jurisdiction unless they are in fresh pursuit or are accompanied by officers of the jurisdiction in which the arrest is made. People v. Lindsey, 805 P.2d 1134 (Colo. App. 1990).

Violations of this section are not per se violations of constitutionally protected rights. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1984); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986).

When this section has been violated by a peace officer, evidence obtained as a result of the violation should be suppressed if the violation also infringes a constitutional right of the defendant, such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986).

An arrest in violation of the statute does not mandate suppression of evidence obtained therefrom unless the violation is willful or so egregious as to violate the defendant's constitutional rights. People v. Lindsey, 805 P.2d 1134 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Loggins, 981 P.2d 630 (Colo. App. 1998).

This section held not to require the suppression of evidence where police officer accompanied injured person to a hospital outside his jurisdiction, emergency room personnel discovered cocaine on the injured person, and the cocaine was delivered to the officer. People v. Loggins, 981 P.2d 630 (Colo. App. 1998).

The departure by an officer from the scene of the crime to get the assistance of other officers, returning forty-five minutes later, did not constitute such a break in the chain of events that at the time of the ensuing arrest he would have been required to have had a warrant, inasmuch as an arrest incidental to fresh pursuit need not be immediate, recognizing that considerable time may be needed to procure necessary assistance; the peace officers had probable cause to arrest, acted without unreasonable delay, and thus a warrant was not required. Schindelar v. Michaud, 411 F.2d 80 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US 956, 90 S. Ct. 426, 24 L. Ed.2d 420 (1969) (decided under repealed § 39-14-5, C.R.S. 1963).

Where the police officer began chasing the defendant in Denver and remained in fresh pursuit until the automobile was finally stopped in Aurora, his authority to partake in the arrest and related matters in the form of an inventory search existed beyond the boundaries of his original jurisdiction by virtue of this section. People v. Roddy, 188 Colo. 55, 532 P.2d 958 (1975).

"Fresh pursuit" defined as in section 16-3-104. Although the definition in § 16-3-104(1)(c) was promulgated by the general assembly to define "fresh pursuit" as used in that section, it is persuasive in defining the same term as used in this section. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 600 P.2d 64 (1979).

Three criteria used in determining "fresh pursuit". Three criteria are to be utilized in analyzing what police activity can be categorized as fresh pursuit. They are: (1) The police must act without unnecessary delay; (2) the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted, but there need not be continuous surveillance of the suspect or uninterrupted knowledge of his whereabouts; and (3) the relationship between the commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the suspect -- the greater the length of time, the less likely the police action constituted fresh pursuit. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 600 P.2d 64 (1979).

Characterization as "fresh pursuit" not precluded even though officer does not follow suspect's route. Where the police responded immediately to a call concerning a hit-and-run accident and promptly pursued the only lead available, the address of the owner of the vehicle, the fact that the officer did not follow the suspect's route did not preclude the characterization of his action as fresh pursuit. Charnes v. Arnold, 198 Colo. 362, 600 P.2d 64 (1979).

Execution of arrest warrant where no fresh pursuit. Where the element of "fresh pursuit" is not present, it is immaterial who executes an arrest warrant provided that individuals with lawful authority to make an arrest are actually present at the scene of the arrest and participate in the arrest process. People v. Schultz, 200 Colo. 47, 611 P.2d 977 (1980).

Applied in People v. Lott, 197 Colo. 78, 589 P.2d 945 (1979).